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HE Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
was passed in 1990 to expand the reach of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and make discrimination on the basis of disability unlawful.1 The wheelchair symbol has become a universal sign of disability, but there are, of course, many types of disability
that have been the basis of discrimination over the
years, including blindness, deafness, epilepsy, cancer,
heart disease, and mental retardation. AIDS is a disability under the ADA, and most commentators
have assumed that infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) also qualifies as a disability under this act. It was not, however, until the
summer of 1998 that the first discrimination case involving HIV infection or AIDS to reach the U.S.
Supreme Court, Bragdon v. Abbott, gave the Court
the opportunity to interpret the ADA as it applies to
HIV infection and to rule that Congress intended
HIV infection to be included as a disability under
the law.2
THE DENTIST AND HIS PATIENT

Sidney Abbott has been HIV-positive since 1986
but does not yet have AIDS. In 1994, she went to
the office of Randon Bragdon, a dentist in Bangor,
Maine, for an appointment. In a pre-examination
questionnaire, she noted that she was HIV-positive.
After examining Abbott’s teeth, Bragdon determined
that she had a cavity that needed filling. He informed Abbott that he had a policy against filling
cavities in HIV-infected patients in his office but
that he would fill the cavity in a hospital if Abbott
agreed to pay the additional cost of using the hospital. Abbott declined the offer and brought suit
against the dentist under the ADA, alleging discrimination on the basis of her disability.
The ADA states, “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
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ties, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any person
who . . . operates a place of public accommodation.” The term “public accommodation” is defined
as including “the professional office of a health care
provider.” The prohibition against discrimination
contains a qualification that permits discrimination
when the person seeking services “poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of others.”1
On the basis of written pleadings and affidavits,
the trial court granted the plaintiff summary judgment in her favor, finding that her HIV infection
satisfied the ADA’s definition of disability and that
there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether her infection posed “a direct threat to the
health or safety of others” during a dental procedure. The court relied on an affidavit from an officer
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), stating that dental treatment is safe for dentists as long as they follow universal precautions
against blood-borne pathogens.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, but on the safety issue,
it relied on the 1993 CDC dentistry guidelines and
the policy of the American Dental Association on
HIV infection.4 These guidelines not only require
the routine use of barrier protection, such as gloves
and masks, but also require that all dental instruments that penetrate tissue or bone be sterilized by
heat. When the case came before the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Court certified only two questions for its
review: Is HIV infection a disability under the ADA,
and should the courts defer to the professional judgment of an individual health care provider who believes a patient’s HIV infection poses a direct threat?
HIV AND THE ADA

Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinion, in which four other justices concurred. The
opinion begins with the ADA’s definition of disability, which is “(A) a physical or mental impairment
[in a person] that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.”1 The Court first considered whether HIV infection itself is a physical impairment. The Court had little problem finding that
it is, primarily on the basis of medical literature describing when the infection begins and its “predictable and, as of today, unalterable course.” In the
Court’s words, in the initial stage of HIV infection,
“the assault on the immune system is immediate.
. . . There is no latency period,” although it may be
7 to 11 years before the CD4+ count drops below
200 cells per cubic millimeter of blood.2 The Court
concluded, “In light of the immediacy with which
the virus begins to damage the infected person’s
white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we
hold it is an impairment from the moment of infecVol ume 33 9
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tion [and must be regarded] . . . as a physiological
disorder with a constant and detrimental effect on
the infected person’s hemic and lymphatic systems
from the moment of infection.”2
To qualify as a disability according to the ADA’s
definition, the impairment must not only be physical
or mental but must also limit a major life activity.
Abbott argued that since HIV infection could reasonably cause a person to decide not to have a child,
it affected reproduction, which she also argued is a
major life activity. The Court agreed and noted specifically, “Reproduction and the sexual dynamics
surrounding it are central to the life process itself.”2
The Court further noted that HIV infection could
substantially limit one’s ability to reproduce in two
independent ways: by putting one’s sexual partner
“at significant risk of becoming infected,” and by
risking infection of one’s offspring through perinatal
transmission of HIV.2
The Court was not impressed with the arguments
that the risk of transmission to the child can be reduced to 8 percent and that reproduction with HIV
infection was still possible, although it is more risky
than without HIV infection. In the Court’s words,
“the disability definition does not turn on personal
choice. When significant limitations result from the
impairment, the definition is met even if the difficulties are not insurmountable.”2 The Court found that
Abbott’s statement that her HIV infection “controlled
her decision not to have a child” was “unchallenged.”
Therefore, the Court concluded that her HIV infection was a physical impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity. The Court thus found it
unnecessary to decide whether HIV infection alone
is a disability under the ADA in all cases.
RISKS TO HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS

The only question remaining was whether the
dentist could use his “professional judgment” of risk
to refuse to provide treatment in his office. The
Court decided that a personal judgment, even one
made in good faith, was insufficient under the ADA.
In the Court’s words, “As a health care professional,
petitioner had the duty to assess the risk of infection
based on the objective, scientific information available to him and others in his profession.”2 Using the
standard of objective scientific evidence, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals
had properly refused to give any weight to the dentist’s offer to treat the patient in a hospital, because
the dentist had provided no “objective, medical evidence showing that treating [the patient] in a hospital would be safer.”2
A related question was what role statements by
public health authorities and professional organizations should have in setting the standards for the
profession. The Court concluded that the statements of such organizations are “of special weight

and authority” but that they are “not conclusive,”
and a health care professional who disagrees with
them may refute them “by citing a credible scientific
basis for deviating from the accepted norm.”2
The Court also addressed the reliance of the
Court of Appeals on the CDC dentistry guidelines
and the standards of the American Dental Association. The CDC guidelines recommend the use of
universal precautions, which “should reduce the risk
of disease transmission in the dental environment.”
Unlike the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
thought that judges could not make a determination
of risk on the basis of the guidelines alone, because
the guidelines suggest “the best way to combat the
risk of HIV transmission. They do not assess the level of risk.”2 Nor was the American Dental Association’s conclusion that patients with HIV infection
“may be safely treated in private dental offices when
appropriate infection control procedures are employed” found a sufficient basis on which to judge
risks.2 The Court found it commendable that the association encouraged its members to provide care
for HIV-infected patients but concluded that the
question, under the ADA, was “one of statistical
likelihood, not professional responsibility.” Thus,
despite serious doubt that the dentist will be able to
produce any scientific evidence to support his fears,
the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether its conclusion on the
risk to the dentist would change if it considered
more than just the CDC and American Dental Association guidelines. Oral arguments are unlikely to
take place before the end of the year.
THE DISSENT

Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion for himself and three other justices. He
was willing to assume that HIV infection is a physical impairment (a point the dentist did not challenge). But he disagreed that reproduction is a major life activity under the ADA “in the same sense
that ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working’ are.”2 The chief justice conceded
that reproductive decisions are important, but he
concluded that what is common to major life activities is not their importance but the fact that they
“are repetitively performed and essential in the dayto-day existence of a normally functioning individual. They are thus quite different from the series of
activities leading to the birth of a child.”2
Moreover, the chief justice observed, even if he
agreed that reproduction was a major life activity, he
would still disagree that HIV infection “substantially limits” it, because “those so infected are still entirely able to engage in sexual intercourse, give birth
to a child if they become pregnant, and perform the
manual tasks necessary to rear a child to maturity.”2
Vol ume 33 9
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The fact that someone infected with HIV “may
choose not to engage in these activities” does not
mean that HIV infection constitutes a limit on one’s
life activities.2 The chief justice wrapped up his argument by noting that the Court’s position, “taken
to its logical extreme, would render every individual
with a genetic marker for some debilitating disease
‘disabled’ here and now because of some possible future effects.”2 On the question of a “direct threat,”
the chief justice agreed that the case should be remanded for a full hearing but stated that the courts
should be more sympathetic to the dentist’s view of
the risk given the severity of the risk.2
HIV AND DISABILITY

The question posed by Bragdon v. Abbott is what
Congress intended when it passed the ADA. The
Supreme Court’s conclusion that Congress intended
the ADA to apply to persons with HIV infection is
consistent with virtually everything written on the
subject. For example, the Court noted that before
the ADA was passed, every court and every administrative agency that had considered the issue under
the Rehabilitation Act had found that it provided
protection against discrimination for persons with
HIV infection.2 Congress, of course, knew of these
interpretations before passing the ADA. The Court
concluded that in passing the ADA, Congress “intended to give that position its active endorsement.”2
The majority of the Court decided that reproduction is a major life activity under the ADA.
Nonetheless, the opinion left many questions unresolved. The first involves the nature of reproduction
itself. The Supreme Court assumes that reproduction will be accomplished by sexual intercourse, and
it is this act that puts the sexual partner at risk. Of
course, with the new techniques of assisted reproduction, sexual intercourse is not required for reproduction. Moreover, with the use of donor gametes
and a “surrogate” mother, there is no risk of transmitting HIV to the child. The point is that what
HIV infection really limits is the combination of sex
and reproduction, not either one in isolation. HIVinfected persons can take precautions — much the
way the dentist could have — and continue to have
“safe sex.” And using the new reproductive techniques, HIV-infected persons can reproduce without putting anyone else at risk of infection. The Supreme Court’s decision, however, might mean that
infertile persons who needed time off from work to
undergo treatment for infertility could not be discriminated against for this reason.5,6 The Court did
not discuss the question of whether the patient
would be protected by the ADA if she were infertile
(e.g., because of a hysterectomy) before she became
infected with HIV, nor did it discuss the question of
whether gay or lesbian patients would be protected,
although the Court properly noted that others are
1257 ·

likely to contend that “HIV infection imposes substantial limitations on other major life activities.”2
REPRODUCTION AND RISK

More interesting is the Court’s view of risk. HIVinfected women can, of course, have children, and
many do. There is, however, a risk, often estimated
at about 25 percent, that the mother will transmit
HIV to her child. The risk can be reduced to about
8 percent with the use of a zidovudine treatment
regimen.7 The Court concluded, in an unartful sentence, that an 8 percent risk of transmitting “a dread
and fatal disease to one’s child” is a “substantial limitation on reproduction.”2 Of course, if the risk of
HIV transmission from mother to child were reduced to zero or nearly zero because of improved
prevention methods, HIV would then no longer
substantially limit reproduction. Elimination of the
risk associated with reproduction would not necessarily disqualify HIV as a disability, but another major life activity, such as education or employment,
would have to be restricted for HIV infection to be
covered by the ADA. On the other hand, as the
chief justice properly recognized, if the reasoning
that an 8 percent risk substantially limits reproduction were “taken to its logical extreme,” everyone
who was the carrier of a debilitating genetic disease
would be considered disabled.2 Also, since the Court
believes that persons infected with HIV are disabled
from the moment of infection (even if they do not
know they are infected), everyone who carries such
genes could be considered disabled from birth.
The question of genetic disability was not examined in this decision, but a few points are worth
making. First, in the case of most persons who carry
genes for “dread and fatal” diseases, the genes are
recessive, and a carrier of a recessive gene must reproduce with another carrier of the same gene to incur the risk of having children with the disease itself
(usually a 25 percent risk). In such a case, is it only
the couple as a couple that is disabled (in which case
the ADA does not offer protection), or is each member of the couple disabled? Moreover, prenatal tests
are available for some diseases (e.g., Tay–Sachs disease), and if the results are positive, the pregnancy
can be aborted. Since prenatal testing eliminates the
risk of transmitting the disease to a child, is the condition still one that “substantially limits” reproduction? And are persons who are carriers of genes that
predispose them to “dread” diseases (such as breast
cancer) disabled, even though they have no disease
themselves?8,9
HEALTH CARE AND RISK

Once the issue of disability has been resolved, the
only remaining question is whether the health care
provider can establish that the disabled person poses
“a direct threat” to the provider. The issue of risk
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has been at the heart of the HIV epidemic for more
than a decade: What is the risk of transmission of
HIV from health care provider to patient and from
patient to health care provider? This question became a national obsession with the death of Kimberly Bergalis in 1991 at the age of 23 years. Bergalis
was the first person known to have been infected
with HIV by a health care provider (her dentist, David Acer). Many individuals and organizations, including the U.S. Senate, the CDC, and the American Medical Association, overreacted to her death by
recommending that all infected health care providers
refrain from performing invasive procedures.10 Instead of focusing on whether there was a “significant
risk” of transmission from health care practitioner to
patient, discussions of the Bergalis case focused on
whether there was any risk. The fact that Bragdon
v. Abbott involves a dentist’s fear of his patient rather
than a patient’s fear of her dentist does not change
the risk analysis of disability. The question is whether disabled persons can be excluded from important
human activities because others would prefer not to
deal with them out of prejudice or irrational fear.
Bragdon v. Abbott was remanded to the Circuit
Court of Appeals to reconsider the issue of the risk
of HIV transmission to the dentist. The majority of
the justices on the Supreme Court seem to believe
that the dentist will be unable to demonstrate a “significant risk” of harm, whereas the minority seem to
believe that the dentist will prevail. The majority
opinion is almost certainly correct. The standard for
permissible discrimination against a disabled person
was set forth by the Court in 1987 in School Board
of Nassau County v. Arline, a case in which the Supreme Court prohibited a school board from firing
a teacher who had a recurrence of tuberculosis contracted 20 years earlier.11 The Court found that she
was a “handicapped individual” under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and thus was protected against
discrimination unless she posed “a significant risk of
communicating an infectious disease to others in the
workplace . . . if a reasonable accommodation will
not eliminate that risk.”11 The Court specified that an
“individualized inquiry” must be made in each case.
The American Medical Association offered standards for such an inquiry that were adopted by the
Court: the determination of “significant risk” should
be based “on reasonable medical judgments given
the state of medical knowledge” about how the disease is transmitted, the duration of the risk, the
severity of the potential harm if the disease is transmitted, and the probability of transmission.11 This
approach was adopted in the ADA, which permits a
defense against a charge of discrimination if the disabled person poses “a direct threat,” defined as “a
significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies,
practices, or procedures or by the provision of aux-

iliary aids or services.”1 An assessment of the risk
must be based on “medical or other objective evidence.”2 The party that wishes to exclude the disabled person has the burden of proving that the person poses a direct threat.
Under these standards, the dentist will not be able
to demonstrate that filling the tooth of an HIVinfected patient poses a “significant risk” to himself
or his staff. The chief justice may have believed that
the dentist could prove his case because he conflated
two equally important requirements: the demonstration of a “significant risk” and the demonstration of
“substantial harm.” There is no question that HIV
infection is a substantial harm; the probability of this
harm, however, is an independent factor in determining whether a risk is significant. The chief justice, relying entirely on a 1994 CDC report of seven “possible” cases of transmission of HIV from patients to
dental workers, concluded, “Given the ‘severity of
the risk’ involved here, i.e., near certain death, and
the fact that no public health authority had outlined
a protocol for eliminating this risk in the context of
routine dental treatment, it seems likely that petitioner can establish that it was objectively reasonable
for him to conclude that treating respondent in his
office posed ‘a direct threat’ to his safety.”2
The chief justice adopted the historically seductive
argument that any possible risk of death should be
sufficient to justify excluding people with disabilities
from activities, regardless of how low the probability
of harm is. This is the same argument that was used
in the past to prevent wheelchair users from flying
on commercial airplanes and hearing-aid users from
driving buses.12,13 The argument has also been accepted by lower-court judges to exclude HIV-infected physicians from performing surgery14 and HIVinfected nurses from practicing nursing.15 The issue,
however, is not only the possibility of death but also
the likelihood of the risk of death. In the Court’s
words, “few, if any, activities in life are risk free, and
the ADA does not ask whether a risk exists, but
whether it is significant.” Rehnquist’s argument, taken to its logical extreme, would mean that no patients with potentially fatal infectious diseases, including hepatitis B, are protected from discrimination
by the ADA, since the health care provider’s risk of
contracting such a disease from a patient will always
be greater than zero. This result would undermine the
very purpose of the act. In this case, the risk of HIV
transmission was extremely low, certainly so low that
it cannot be used as a justification for discrimination
against HIV-infected patients.10 If there were a significant risk of infection, it is unlikely that either the
American Dental Association or Bragdon would rely
on questionnaires to determine the HIV status of
patients; mandatory testing would be required. By
making discrimination unlawful, the ADA actually
encourages people at risk to be tested for HIV.
Vol ume 33 9
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The ADA is a historic civil-rights law that properly
protects all disabled Americans from many forms of
discrimination that result from fear and prejudice.
As former President George Bush put it when he
signed the act, referring to the estimated 43 million
disabled Americans, “Every man, woman, and child
with a disability can now pass through a once-closed
door to a bright new era of equality, independence,
and freedom.” The application of the law to HIV infection, in the context of continuing stigmatization
and discrimination in the health care setting, has
now been properly affirmed by the Supreme Court.
This decision comports with the ethical principles of
the medical and dental professions and with the use
of universal precautions.
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